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ARTICLE
THE PERILS OF EMPOWERMENT
Jane Aiken* and Katherine Goldwasser**
This Article examines bystander norms of disinterest and blame that
inform and undermine strategies for dealing with significant social
problems such as domestic violence.  Current strategies rely on individ-
ual “empowerment” to reduce such violence.  These strategies reflect
fundamental misconceptions and false assumptions about the nature of
domestic violence, about why this sort of violence persists so stubbornly,
and, ultimately, about what it takes to change behavior that has long
been tolerated, if not actually fostered, as a result of deeply imbedded
social and cultural norms.  The net effect is that far from empowering
abused women, let alone reaching the norms that have made this form of
abuse such an intractable problem, the so-called empowerment ap-
proach instead perpetuates the traditional view of domestic violence as a
private matter, properly the business of no one except the two intimates
themselves.  Everyone else is a mere bystander.  The responsibility for
ending domestic violence is squarely placed in the hands of its (suppos-
edly) now-empowered victims: it is up to each individual battered woman
to end the violence against her; if she fails she has only herself to blame.
Drawing on the literature on norms and the law, we analyze how suc-
cessful norm-changing strategies in other contexts suggest a different
and more effective approach to the problem of domestic violence.  The
conscious change of tactics in anti-smoking campaigns from a focus on
protecting the smoker to a focus on protecting non-smokers has resulted
in a surprisingly rapid change in cultural norms about smoking.  Lessons
drawn from that campaign suggest new strategies for coping with domes-
tic violence.  The Article concludes that given the financial and personal
negative effects of domestic violence on third parties, norm changing
strategies that rely, not on notions of individual empowerment and au-
tonomy, but rather on strategies grounded in the idea that domestic vio-
lence is a community problem that affects us all, are far more likely to
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have an impact on reducing intimate violence.  Such norm-changing
strategies transform the bystander into an interested party.
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The facts are all too familiar.  This time they occurred in St. Louis,
Missouri.  Kelli Alexander, caught up in a contentious divorce initiated
after years of abuse by her husband John, sought a court order to obtain
protection from him.  In her petition, she stated, “My husband has a very
violent temper and has hit me, kicked me, pushed me, threatened me with
a knife and threatened to kill me.  I left with the children, and the
consequences are going to be unimaginable.”1  The court granted Kelli’s
request and entered an order directing John to stay away from her
except as needed to facilitate John’s court-ordered visitation with their
three young children.  Several weeks later, Kelli was to bring the
children to an agreed-upon public place to make them available for a
visit with John.  She drove alone; her friend April Wheeler, with whom
Kelli and the children were staying, had the Alexander children with her
and followed behind.  John waited along the road he knew his wife would
be traveling.  When he spotted her he emerged, rammed her car head-on
with his own car, and approached on foot.  Seeing what was happening,
April pulled up, left the Alexander children in her car, and approached
as well.  With the Alexander children watching, John pulled a gun and
shot and killed both women.  He then sped away and was killed when he
lost control of his car during a high-speed chase by police.  The entire
chain of events left three children orphaned and two others without their
mother.2
In the aftermath of these events, a letter to the editor in the local
paper decried that Kelli had done “everything right” to escape her
husband’s abuse and yet still ended up dead.3  A letter in response
“t[ook] issue with” that view, based on the fact that Kelli had failed to
1 Michelle Munz, Those Near Him Saw John Alexander’s Rage, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 2005, at C1.
2 William C. Lhotka, Court Takes up Case of 3 Children, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 25, 2005, at A1.
3 Paul Milligan, Letter to the Editor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 2005, at B2.
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take proper protective measures by availing herself of her right under
state law to carry a concealed weapon:4
The system provide[d] for Kelli to protect herself and her children.
She was over twenty-one with a clean record and legally could have had
any gun she owned in the car with her when she was attacked.  If she had
used her right to self-defense, her friend would still be alive, and her
children would still have their mother.5
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the problem of domestic violence.6  A
good deal of the scholarship has focused on legal remedies for the vio-
lence, with the aim of either improving the efficacy of existing remedies
or proposing the adoption of new ones.  The bulk of the remedies in use
today came into existence in the 1970s.  Developed with an understand-
ing that domestic violence is at bottom an exercise of domination and
control, these legal reforms focused on empowering battered women so
that they could put their abusive relationships behind them and take
charge of their own lives.7  This notion of “empowerment” as a means of
addressing the problem of domestic violence is what prompted us to join
the fray.
We have come to believe that, if the aim is to significantly reduce
domestic violence, approaches that focus on empowering abused women
are flawed in ways that render them not just ineffective, but actually
counterproductive.  Our thesis is that the use of such strategies reflects
4 See 38 MO. REV. STAT. § 571.030.3 (2009).
5 Marion Madden, Letter to the Editor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 2005, at B6.
6 Throughout this Article, we use the term “domestic violence,” not in its generic (and
gender-neutral) sense, but to refer to the physical, sexual, and/or psychological abuse of a
woman by her male intimate partner.  Similarly, we use the term “batterer” to refer to a man
who engages in any form of domestic violence, including abuse that is purely psychological.
Also on the subject of terminology, we are mindful that use of “victim” and “battered woman”
in this context is not free from controversy. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity
and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 530–31 (1992) (criticizing the term “victim” as a “problematic characteri-
zation” and the term “battered woman” as “a static, inaccurate account of the many life exper-
iences of a woman who has been battered”).  Nonetheless, we use these terms interchangeably
to refer to a woman who has experienced domestic violence.
7 For historical accounts chronicling the development of legal remedies, see, for exam-
ple, ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 7–8 (1987); SUSAN SCHECHTER,
WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S
MOVEMENT 29–32 (1982); Albert R. Roberts & Karel Kurst-Swanger, Police Responses to
Battered Women: Past, Present, and Future, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVEN-
TION STRATEGIES: POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND LEGAL REMEDIES 101, 102–04 (Albert R. Roberts
ed., 2002); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657.  For the perspective of an advocate during
this period, see DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (rev. ed. 1981).
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fundamental misconceptions and false assumptions about the nature of
domestic violence, about why this sort of violence persists, notwithstand-
ing the panoply of legal remedies designed to combat it, and, ultimately,
about what it takes to change behavior that has long been tolerated, if not
actually fostered, as a result of deeply imbedded social and cultural
norms.
Part I of the Article describes the basics of what we call the empow-
erment approach, including its historical context,8 the thinking behind it,9
and the legal remedies it has spawned.10  Of particular interest to us,
because of its centrality to the empowerment approach, is the civil order
of protection, an order that can be issued at the behest of an abuse victim
in which a court imposes legally binding restrictions on her batterer.
In Part II, we discuss two problems with the empowerment ap-
proach that, taken together, help explain why the remedies developed in
connection with this approach have not come close to fulfilling the prom-
ise they initially seemed to hold.  Subsection A of Part II examines cer-
tain misconceptions and false assumptions that underlie the remedies, the
existence of which calls into question how well these remedies could
ever reasonably be expected to work.  Subsection B then addresses a
problem that goes to the heart of the empowerment approach: the very
changes that were ostensibly meant to empower battered women have
instead paved the way for the state—indeed, for all of us—to put respon-
sibility for ending domestic violence in the hands of its victims and avoid
dealing with the problem ourselves.  Although in some ways extreme,
the letter to the editor quoted in the epigraph to this Article captures the
prevailing view: it is up to each individual battered woman to end the
violence against her; if she fails she has only herself to blame.
In Part III we offer some thoughts about the seeming intractability
of the problem of domestic violence and about where to go from here.
We think there is a link between our reliance on the empowerment ap-
proach and the persistence of the norms that have allowed this violence
to flourish for so long.  We are convinced that changing these norms
calls for a different approach to the problem—one that relies, not on
notions of individual empowerment or autonomy, but rather on strategies
grounded in the idea that domestic violence is a community problem.
These strategies range from social marketing campaigns designed to
elicit concern about the social costs of tolerating woman battering to ap-
proaches that treat domestic violence as a public health or similar com-
munity-wide problem calling for community-wide preventive efforts in
response.  The common denominator is that they all embrace the idea
8 See infra Part I.A.
9 See infra Part I.B.
10 See infra Part I.A.
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that domestic violence is not a problem between individuals, affecting
only them, and for which they, alone, are responsible, but as a problem
that affects us all.
I. THE EMPOWERMENT APPROACH TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
A. Historical and Legal Backdrop
Violence against women by their male partners is a major social
problem throughout the world.11  In this country, as elsewhere, determin-
ing the extent of the problem is difficult because it generally occurs in
private and often goes unreported.12  Still, estimates abound.  According
to the U.S. Department of Justice, intimate partners commit 4.8 million
physical assaults and rapes against women in the United States each
year.13  This translates into roughly one woman being battered every
seven seconds.  It is estimated that one of every four American women
will be physically or sexually abused by an intimate during her
lifetime.14
Placed in historical perspective, the idea that domestic violence is
anything other than a purely private matter, let alone a serious social
problem, is a relatively recent phenomenon.15  From the time of the first
colonists until the 1960s, with but a few exceptions, inattention to do-
11 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 89 (Etienne G.
Krug et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/
world_report/en/full_en.pdf.
12 Id. at 92; see also PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2000), available at
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm; Ronet Bachman, Incidence Rates of Violence
Against Women: A Comparison of Annual Incidence Rates and Contextual Characteristics of
Intimate-Partner Violence Against Women from the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) and the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS), 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 839 (2000).
13 NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
(2003), available at www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/ipv.htm [hereinafter COSTS OF INTI-
MATE PARTNER VIOLENCE].  As evident from the estimates, there was no attempt in the study
to count abuse that was strictly psychological and/or emotional. Id.
14 TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 12, at iii.  Other studies have arrived at similar
figures. See, e.g., KAREN SCOTT COLLINS ET AL., HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN’S
LIFESPAN: THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN’S HEALTH (1999), available
at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Healthconcerns__surveyreport.pdf.
15 See generally LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WO-
MEN: A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE
(2008); PLECK, supra note 7.  While accounts vary as to the extent to which the law actually
approved physical chastisement of women, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of
Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2125 n.25 (1996) (col-
lecting cases).  It is generally agreed that even after such conduct was criminalized in all
jurisdictions, it still was largely ignored, SCHECHTER, supra note 7, at 12–20.
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mestic violence was the order of the day.16  The rare occasions when the
issue received attention were invariably followed by periods of retrench-
ment, usually marked by an upsurge in talk about the family, family life,
and the importance of guarding against any outside interference, above
all by the state, into family privacy.17  The resolve to protect the family
in this way was based on the idea that the public world was hard, calcu-
lating, and business-like, and the world of the family, or private sphere,
was loving, caring, and uniquely personal.18  This demarcation between
public and private spheres made addressing domestic abuse especially
difficult.
In the late 1960s, feminist activists began to call attention to the
problem of intimate violence.19  They asserted that the right of women to
control their own bodies and lives was both fundamental and non-negoti-
able.  This belief formed the basis for the work of the battered women’s
movement.20  Movement advocates challenged the long-standing treat-
ment of woman abuse as a private, family matter contending that such
treatment was symptomatic of a patriarchal society in which women
were consistently devalued.21  These advocates pushed for a wholesale
change in society’s response to domestic violence involving the creation
of new non-patriarchal norms for intimate partner relationships,22 social
and economic equality for women in every area of their lives, safe and
affordable housing, childcare, and other services for battered women
who left their batterers, and, importantly, legal reform that would enable
these women to make use of the panoply of available support services
and take control of their lives.23  Much of this was framed in the rhetoric
of “the personal is political,”24 an expression of the view that women’s
individual experiences are to a great extent the product, not of personal
choice, but rather of limitations imposed on them from without by a sys-
tem of male domination and control.25  Under this view, any attempt to
16 PLECK, supra note 7, at 4–6.  One exception involved the Puritans of Massachusetts
Bay and Plymouth colonies; the other spanned a period from the mid-1870s until about 1890.
Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 6–7.
18 Id. at 8–9.
19 LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE 1–2 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2002) (1988).
20 SCHECHTER, supra note 7, at 29–30.
21 G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 274–76 (2005).
22 MARTIN, supra note 7, at 188.
23 KRISTIN A. KELLY, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 55 (2003).
24 Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in FEMINIST REVOLUTION: REDSTOCKINGS OF
THE WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENT 204–05 (Kathie Sarachild ed., Random House 1978)
(1975).
25 In the essay, Hanisch takes issue with the view that women’s groups of the 1960s were
a form of “therapy” for “personal problems” and states: “One of the first things we discover in
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compartmentalize women’s lives into separate public and private spheres
only served to reinforce male control within the family.26  It was time
that the abuse of women emerge from behind the veil of family privacy
and be recognized for what it really was: a tool for the control of women.
Legal reform was viewed as an important component of the effort to
secure real relief for the millions of women experiencing domestic vio-
lence.27  The physical abuse perpetrated against these women was, to be
sure, prosecutable criminal conduct everywhere.28  Yet, police and prose-
cutors had been slow to act, treating woman abuse as domestic squabbles
of little importance or worse, as an unobjectionable method of control
within the family.29  Women needed a way to protect themselves and
their children from their batterers, they needed an easy way to signal
police on the scene to ask them to intervene, and they needed provision
for support of children once the batterer was removed.  They needed this
these groups is that personal problems are political problems.  There are no personal solutions
at this time.  There is only collective action for a collective solution.” Id. at 204.
26 Id.
27 KELLY, supra note 23, at 68.
28 Id. at 88.  This was not so, of course, of the psychological and emotional abuse, which
could be every bit as disabling. See Ann L. Coker et al., Physical Health Consequences of
Physical and Psychological Intimate Partner Violence, 9 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 451 (2000);
Erin S. Straight et al., The Impact of Partner Psychological Abuse on Health Behaviors and
Health Status in College Women, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1035 (2003).  For many
years, in many jurisdictions laws commonly exempted forcible sexual intercourse by a man
with his wife from the definition of rape. NEAL MILLER, INST. FOR LAW & JUSTICE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION DEFINING POLICE AND PROSECUTION DUTIES
AND POWERS 8 (2004),  available at  http:/ /www.ilj .org/publications/docs/
Domestic_Violence_Legislation.pdf.
29 MARTIN, supra note 7, at 93; Sack, supra note 7, 163–65.  Del Martin provides the
following telling example from a Michigan police training manual on how to handle domestic
violence calls:
a. Avoid arrest if possible.  Appeal to their vanity.
b. Explain the procedure of obtaining a warrant.
(1) Complainant must sign complaint.
(2) Must appear in court.
(3) Consider loss of time.
(4) Cost of court.
c. State that your only interest is to prevent a breach of the peace.
d. Explain that attitudes usually change by court time.
e. Recommend a postponement.
(1) Court not in session.
(2) No judge available.
f. Don’t be too harsh or critical.
MARTIN, supra note 7, at 94. Some police departments observed informal stitch rules: a wife
who was abused had to require a certain number of surgical sutures before a husband could be
arrested for assault and battery.  Richard Gelles, Public Policy for Violence Against Women:
30 Years of Successes and Remaining Challenges, 19 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 298, 298
(2000); see also Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Do-
mestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1852–53 (2001) (suggesting that the police
role in domestic violence situations is often more one of a peacemaker than a law enforcer).
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relief quickly and without cost.  Enactment of new laws and enforcement
of existing laws could serve those functions, while also communicating
clearly that in this society, woman abuse was not a private, relationship
issue, but a matter of great public importance and concern.
During the 1970s, a number of states enacted legislation designed to
address these needs.30  Under the new legislation, the remedy of choice
for battered women was a form of victim-initiated and court-issued re-
straining order variously referred to as a “civil protection order” (CPO),
an “order of protection” (OP), or similar names.31  At the start of the
decade, only the District of Columbia and New York provided for such a
remedy.32  In 1976, Pennsylvania joined in with its Protection from
Abuse Act.33  Within a short time, well over half the states had adopted
new legislation that included this sort of remedy.34  By the mid-1990s, all
jurisdictions had such legislation, and that remains true today.35
While the particulars vary, all protective order statutory schemes
have certain features in common.36  The remedy is “victim-initiated” and
civil in nature.37  The victim-initiated aspect means that no one except
the victim herself is entitled to seek a protection order—not a child in the
home or other family member or friend, and not any state or government
official such as a social service worker or the police.  It is the woman’s
remedy to invoke or not as she sees fit.  The civil nature of the remedy
means that even if the showing made by the woman establishes that her
abuser has engaged in criminal conduct, no jail sentence or even a con-
viction will result.38  But the civil nature of the proceeding also means
that proof by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the criminal
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, is all that is required.39  Upon
such a showing, a full order of protection is granted.40
30 Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved
Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 362 (2002).
31 KELLY, supra note 23, at 74.
32 Janice L. Grau, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A Reassessment,
16 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, 703–04 & n.5 (1982).
33 Id. at 704; see Protection from Abuse Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 10181–10190 (re-
pealed 1990).
34 See Grau, supra note 32, at 704.
35 Ko, supra note 30, at 362.
36 For a comprehensive analysis of all the statutes dealing with orders of protection, see
Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Vi-
olence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107 (2009).
37 Id. at 1111–12.
38 See Roberts & Kurst-Swanger, supra note 7, at 130.  Of course if the violence rises to
the level that it attracts the attention of a prosecutor, it can give rise to a criminal prosecution.
As with the bringing of any other criminal charge, however, this is solely within the discretion
of the prosecuting authority. Id. at 132.
39 See id. at 131.
40 See id.
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In most states, the court has the power to grant a stay away order for
up to three years.41  In some states, the order is renewable for a period of
time without a new showing of abuse.42  The court can also grant posses-
sion of the residence to the victim, grant custody and visitation, order the
payment of child support and maintenance if appropriate, compensate the
victim for damages caused by the respondent including reimbursing ser-
vice providers, require the batterer to participate in batterer’s intervention
or substance abuse treatment programs, and prevent the respondent from
possessing or purchasing firearms.43  If the respondent comes near the
petitioner, he can be arrested for violating the order and, in most jurisdic-
tions, be charged with a misdemeanor.44  In the event of multiple misde-
meanor convictions for such violations, a felony charge may follow.45
Orders of protection were frequently described as an intervention
designed to empower victims of domestic violence.46  The ability to have
the legal system intervene in the battering relationship was designed to
even the odds in order to counteract the gross power discrepancies that
most women in battering relationships experienced.47  Furthermore, be-
ing empowered to be the initiator of the action gave the victim her
“voice” again, a voice that may have been silenced by the dynamics of
the battering relationship.48  Thus, orders of protection not only were de-
signed to provide physical safety, they were also thought to assist a vic-
tim in her psychological recovery.49
Although generally regarded as the centerpiece of the new domestic
violence legislation, victim-initiated civil protective orders were not the
only legal reform.  A number of states took steps designed to change the
41 Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Civil Protection Orders, in THE IMPACT OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE: A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK 200 (Deborah M.
Goelman et al. eds., 1996).
42 Id. at 200.
43 Id. at 202–06.
44 Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Wo-
men: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 897–99 (1993).
45 Id.
46 Ko, supra note 30, at 369.
47 KELLY, supra note 23, at 74–75.
48 Ko, supra note 30, at 369.
49 Id.  To complement this assistance, domestic violence advocates secured increased
shelter for women and children fleeing abuse, initiated counseling programs designed for bat-
tered women and their children, prompted police to train officers about domestic violence, and
urged prosecutors and police officers to have victim service workers who were dedicated to
victims of domestic abuse.  The psychological benefit may be overstated.  As Nina Tarr notes,
“The legal systems and policies that impose the ‘one size fits all’ approach do women a psy-
chological disservice by either forcing them to get an Order of Protection, punishing them for
failing to do so, or denying them a voice and recognition if they fail to comport with the
current agenda.”  Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 157, 159 (2003).
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way their criminal justice systems dealt with such violence as well.50
Some enacted mandatory arrest laws limiting traditional law enforcement
discretion and requiring police to make an arrest in domestic violence
cases whenever there was probable cause.51  Several prosecutors’ offices
went even further and instituted no-drop prosecution policies, requiring
that criminal domestic violence cases go forward regardless of the vic-
tim’s wishes.52  Unlike civil protective orders, these criminal remedies
put primary reliance on state law enforcement officials, rather than the
victim herself.53  Not surprisingly, many proponents of the empower-
ment approach opposed the remedies, particularly the no-drop policies,
on precisely those grounds.54  But other criminal law reforms fit comfort-
ably within the empowerment model.  For example, laws limiting, if not
completely repealing, the spousal exception to the crime of rape,55 the
expansion of police arrest authority so as to permit warrantless arrests for
misdemeanor domestic violence offenses,56 the enactment of measures
designed to ensure domestic violence training and education for police
50 Marion Wanless, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence,
but Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 537.
51 Id. at 534.  By 1996, at least fifteen states and Washington, D.C. had adopted some
version of mandatory arrest legislation. Id. But see Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748,
764 (2005) (holding that the plaintiff had no personal entitlement under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to police enforcement of her restraining order against her
husband based on Colorado’s mandatory arrest law).  Notwithstanding the Colorado legisla-
ture’s repeated use of the word “shall” in describing the duties of a police officer under the
statute, see, for example, id. at 758–59 (quoting portions of the statute), according to the
Court,”[w]e do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made enforcement of
restraining orders mandatory,” id. at 760.
52 See Ava Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 760 (2007).
These no-drop policies were a reflection of a counter-trend in feminist understanding of do-
mestic violence.  At the same time as remedies for domestic violence were being constructed
to empower victims, some experts, led by psychologist Lenore Walker, were beginning to
paint a picture of abuse victims by drawing on a theory known as “learned helplessness.” See
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42–54 (1979).  Under this theory, Walker hy-
pothesized that women who experience sustained violence in intimate relationships sometimes
stayed in those relationships, not because they truly wanted to, but because they had been
stripped of the will to leave. See id.  To counteract this “learned helplessness,” police and
prosecutorial strategies increasingly took decisions out of the hands of the domestic violence
victim on the theory that the state knew better than she did what was best for her. Cf. Gruber,
supra at 747–51 (critiquing various domestic violence law reforms, including no-drop prose-
cution policies, for “treat[ing] victims with increasing amounts of paternalism and disdain”
and for seemingly being premised on “the belief that female victims are weak, damaged, and
unable to recognize their own interests”).
53 See, e.g., Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Auton-
omy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 961 (1999).
54 See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550 (1999).
55 MILLER, supra note 28, at 8–10.
56 Id. at 6.
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and prosecutors,57 and the adoption of anti-stalking laws all comfortably
fit within the empowerment model.58
B. Ideological Roots
Although the battered women’s movement focused first and fore-
most on ending domestic violence, movement advocates had a far
broader sense of their overall mission.  Again, they saw battering as a
tool used to devalue women and enforce male domination and control.59
Consistent with this view, they were committed to working to change the
social and cultural norms that put power in the hands of men at the ex-
pense of women.  This meant both challenging patriarchy’s subordina-
tion of women to men and empowering women to take control of their
own bodies and lives.60  In the domestic violence context, it also meant
contending with the widely held view, rooted in classical liberal theory’s
notion of the strict separation between public and private life, that such
violence was a private matter, not the business of anyone except the two
people involved.  In keeping with this view, battered women had long
been conditioned to remain silent about what they were experiencing at
home.  Battered women’s advocates viewed the public/private dichotomy
as both wrong—the oft-repeated phrase, “the personal is political,” was
an expression of that view—and a powerful contributor to women’s op-
pression.61  They were convinced that to make any real headway against
the problem of domestic violence, it was essential to dismantle this false
dichotomy and recast the problem as one of public importance and
concern.62
Most movement advocates expected little help or support from the
state.  The state, after all, was responsible for insulating this ostensibly
private violence through nonintervention.63  The law’s blindness to the
violence inflicted on women in their homes seemed to signal that such
behavior was acceptable.  Instead of providing some measure of protec-
tion, as it routinely did with victims of other forms of violence by one
individual against another, the state had simply abandoned women to
57 Id. at 6–7.
58 Id. at 22–23.
59 See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 34.
60 Id.
61 See KELLY, supra note 23, at 32–35.
62 Id.; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Getting Our Stories Straight: Narrative Autonomy
and Feminist Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 449, 449 (1997).
63 KELLY, supra note 23, at 68; see also ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND
FEMINIST LAWMAKING 182 (2000) (“Many in th[e battered women’s] movement were skeptical
of an affirmative role for the state; they saw the state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimiz-
ing male control over women, not remedying it; they rejected the idea that battered women
activists ought to trust the state, expect much from the state, or engage with the state in any
way.”).
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face this violence on their own.64  In the view of these advocates, the law
had proved itself to be nothing more than a tool in the service of the state
and a vehicle for women’s subjugation.65  Thus, instead of looking im-
mediately to the legal system, they initially sought to address the prob-
lem in other ways.  One common tack was the establishment of local and
individually autonomous centers, shelters, and programs all aimed at im-
proving the lives of battered women.66  A distinct ideology that empha-
sized victim control and self-help above all else informed how these
entities and programs dealt with the women who came seeking
assistance.67
With little to no public funding for shelters or services, women
looked to each other for the political, economic, emotional, and social
support that many believed only women could provide.68  Women’s
groups largely funded shelters, and individual women opened their
homes to women fleeing domestic violence.69  Advocates chose govern-
ance models that celebrated women’s agency and endorsed non-hierar-
chal methods of operation that featured decision-making by consensus.70
They believed that one had to live the way one wanted the world to be.
It was through this living that change would occur.  They thought that by
living non-hierarchically and imbuing women with their own agency and
autonomy—in short, empowering them—they could create the cultural
changes that were necessary to undermine society’s patriarchal
structure.71
Notwithstanding their general mistrust of the legal system, many
activists saw advocating for domestic violence law reform as an essential
part of their work.  They saw recognition in the law as a way of accom-
plishing multiple objectives at once including bringing domestic violence
into the national spotlight, conveying a message of support to victims,
and making clear that battering was simply unacceptable.  They also be-
lieved that legislation would advance the larger project of transforming
the culture from one that viewed domestic violence as strictly private to
one that instead recognized it to be a national social problem of enor-
mous dimensions.72  As activist pioneer Del Martin explained, “‘You
can’t legislate attitudes’ is a truism in political circles.  But I disagree; I
64 KELLY, supra note 23, at 69.
65 Miccio, supra note 21, at 252.
66 Id. at 256–57.
67 Id. at 257–61.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 258.
70 SCHECTER, supra note 7, at 64.  Even though such models were often difficult to man-
age, many advocates noted that it was better to place power in women’s hands rather than have
a top-down efficient arrangement. See id.
71 Id.
72 KELLY, supra note 23, at 68.
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think that legislation very often effects changes in public attitudes over
time.”73
Many of the activists who favored legislation saw the civil order of
protection as the most attractive remedy because it put in the hands of
victims the ability to take control and chart their own course.74  Unlike
with the criminal law, no longer would a battered woman need to rely on
the police or any other patriarchal figure to save her.75  In short, the civil
remedy empowered her.  It was the woman, and the woman alone, who
decided if and when to act.  This, in their view, was the essence of
autonomy.
Two additional points about movement ideology and empower-
ment-based legislation bear emphasis.  First, the ideal of autonomy that
animated the movement differed from the traditional liberal notion of
autonomy.76  The fact that activists saw battering as linked with patri-
archy meant that, from their perspective, male violence against women
was a concern for all women, not just those who experienced it first-
hand.77  This, in turn, informed their conception of autonomy in the con-
text of domestic violence.  Unlike liberalism’s disconnected, atomistic
version, the feminist version featured a strong sense of the connectedness
of all women because of their common experience of living in a society
that subordinated them to men.78
The other point worth noting here is that the reformers who advo-
cated for the empowerment approach did not believe that law alone
would accomplish all that needed to be done.79  Their conception of em-
powerment went far beyond court access.  Instead, they saw the effort as
multi-faceted, requiring, among other things, programs offering a wide
range of accessible services to support women leaving abusive relation-
ships and, ultimately, changes in the structure of male-female intimate
relationships to ensure gender equality.80  The hope was that providing
victims with a vehicle for self-help and restraining batterers would play a
part in this larger effort and help begin to counter the centuries of condi-
73 MARTIN, supra note 7, at 175.
74 Ruth Lewis et al., Law’s Progressive Potential: The Value of Engagement with the
Law for Domestic Violence, 10 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 (2001).
75 See Gruber, supra note 52, at 760.
76 See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS
OF LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 40 (2002) (“Locke’s position on the natural subjection of
wives is an embarrassment for his general theory of equality.”); Stephen Gardbaum, Liber-
alism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 387 (1996) (discussing the “ideal
of autonomy” in comprehensive and political liberalism).
77 See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999).
78 Id.
79 See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 38.
80 See id. at 31–38.
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tioning and attendant social and cultural norms and values that had toler-
ated battering for so long.81
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPOWERMENT APPROACH82
No doubt a civil order of protection can be helpful to a woman try-
ing to free herself from a battering relationship.  Indeed, the mere knowl-
edge that such a remedy exists can be a source of support.  But the
remedy does not exist today in a vacuum; rather, it is the centerpiece of
an overall strategy to reduce domestic violence by empowering battered
women.  This overall strategy—the empowerment approach—is what
concerns us.  We believe it actually undermines efforts to reduce vio-
lence against women.  In this Part, we discuss two serious problems with
the empowerment approach.  First, it is based on a set of beliefs that
reflect assumptions about the dynamics of intimate violence that range
from shaky to just plain wrong.  Second, the approach is rooted in an
ideology that recognizes the need for—indeed, demands—widespread
social change, but is ill-designed to bring it about.
A. False Assumptions
One obvious assumption behind the idea of empowering battered
women by giving them access to an appropriate legal remedy such as a
civil order of protection is that these orders will work as intended by
providing some measure of (if not complete) protection to the abused
women who obtain them.  For that to happen, however, batterers would
have to obey the orders.  Although in most instances it may be reasona-
ble to assume that people will comply with court orders against them,
that is not the case where batterers are concerned.
For some people, obeying a court order is simply a matter of follow-
ing rules: the fact that a court has ordered them to (or not to) do some-
thing is reason enough to comply.  Batterers, however, are not rule-
followers.  To think that men who are found to have physically, sexually,
and/or psychologically abused their intimate partners (such a finding
generally being the basis for the issuance of an order of protection in the
first instance) will just “cease and desist” if ordered to do so by a court is
simply unrealistic.  Indeed, merely to articulate this idea is to show how
ludicrous it is.83
81 Id. at 33.
82 Consistent with the aim of our Article, the discussion in this section focuses on the
false assumptions that tie in most directly with the empowerment approach.  For a discussion
of various other false assumptions not addressed here, see Leigh Goodmark, Law is the
Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for
Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 19–22, 36, 44 (2004).
83 Victims seem to be aware of this disconnect.  In one study, fewer than half of victims
who received a protection order reported that they thought the man believed that he had to
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Of course, rule-following, for its own sake, is not the only reason
someone might obey a court order; concern about the possible conse-
quences of noncompliance can also be a motivator.  This is in keeping
with basic deterrence theory: the idea that people who might otherwise
violate a rule or law may decide to comply instead because they fear
apprehension and punishment if they disobey.84  Putting to one side the
question whether deterrence theory assumes greater rationality than is
true of most batterers,85 the notion of possible deterrence assumes the
existence of real consequences for violations.86
As applied to batterers and violations of protective orders, the “real
consequences for violations” assumption depends in turn for its validity
on the further assumption that the police, prosecutors, and judges who
play a part in the enforcement of these orders would at least observe, if
not wholly embrace, the new legal regime.  That assumption has unfortu-
nately proved to be unfounded.87  Although vastly improved in the time
since protective order legislation was first adopted, police enforcement of
protective orders is still uneven at best.88  Studies of police handling of
domestic violence incidents have generally found relatively low arrest
obey the order.  Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic
Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 218, 221–22 (Eve S.
Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
84 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1197, 1212 (2007) (“What matters to deterrence is . . . the expected penalty, and the
incentives that penalty creates for future conduct.”).
85 Any such assumption about batterers has been recognized as debatable at best. See,
e.g., JEFFREY FAGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
PROMISES AND LIMITS 30 (1996) (“[D]eterrence logic . . . assumes a rational offender-actor
who weighs the costs of offending—costs associated both with the act itself and the legal
actions that ensue—against whatever benefits that may accrue from the behavior. . . .  Th[is]
logic . . . is compromised among batterers whose behavior is patterned over time and for
whom rational calculations are not possible during the arousal of a violent assault.” (citations
omitted)).
86 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 425
(1999) (“[D]eterrence theory focuses on consequences.”).
87 One study of the civil protection order process called enforcement “the Achilles’ heel
of the civil protection order process, because an order without enforcement at best offers scant
protection and at worst increases the victim’s danger by creating a false sense of security.
Offenders may routinely violate orders, if they believe there is no real risk of being arrested.”
PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLA-
TION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT 49 (1990); see also Klein & Orloff,
supra note 44, at 813 (“Unfortunately, widespread enforcement of civil protection orders is
lacking.”).
88 For a discussion of some of the improvements, see Sack, supra note 7, at 1669–71.
This is by contrast with the early days of protection order legislation, when the idea that
domestic violence was a private, family matter was still prevalent among police policymakers
and line officers, and police practices reflected that view. Id. at 1662–63.  For more on the
unevenness problem, see also infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
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rates for protective order violations.89  Even in the states that have recog-
nized and responded to this unevenness by enacting mandatory arrest
requirements for these violations, arrests are not always made.90  One
study in a mandatory arrest state actually found an inverse relationship
between the two: when police officers were called to the scene of a do-
mestic violence incident, in cases in which there was a violation of an
existing order of protection, police were less likely to make an arrest.91
Generally, prosecutors make the decision to bring a criminal charge
for violating an order of protection.  Yet prosecutors are sometimes re-
luctant to put significant resources into pursuing these prosecutions.92  In
some instances, the reluctance is due to the victim’s unwillingness to
cooperate.93  The fact that violation-of-order-of-protection offenses tend
89 See WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, ACLU, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROTECTIVE ORDERS
AND THE ROLE OF POLICE ENFORCEMENT (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/
womensrights/062007protectiveorders.pdf (“[S]tudies show that often police do not make do-
mestic violence arrests, even in states with laws that require an arrest when there is reasonable
cause to believe a protective order has been violated.  Nationally, one study found domestic
violence assailants were arrested or detained by the police less than half the time - in 47
percent of rape cases, 36 percent of physical assault cases and 28 percent of stalking cases.
Another study found that only 20 percent of domestic violence cases resulted in the police
arresting the assailant.” (citation omitted)).
90 See David Eitle, The Influence of Mandatory Arrest Policies, Police Organizational
Characteristics, and Situational Variables on the Probability of Arrest in Domestic Violence
Cases, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 573, 590–91 (2005) (discussing results of study comparing likeli-
hood of arrest in domestic violence cases in jurisdictions with mandatory arrest policies and
jurisdictions without such policies, and noting that even in jurisdictions that had such policies,
the likelihood of arrest was “still only 50%,” which was just a 5% increase over the 45%
likelihood found in jurisdictions without mandatory policies.)  Earlier studies reported similar
results. See, e.g., Robert J. Kane, Patterns of Arrest in Domestic Violence Encounters: Identi-
fying a Police Decision-Making Model, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 65 (1999) (finding that arrests of
protective order violators in two police districts in Massachusetts, a mandatory arrest state,
were made less than half the time).
91 Robert J. Kane, Police Responses to Restraining Orders in Domestic Violence Inci-
dents: Identifying the Custody-Threshold Thesis, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 561, 572 (2000).
This is not to suggest that arrests are common in cases in which police are called to the scene
of domestic violence but there is no protective order.  To the contrary, police sometimes han-
dle those situations by simply telling the woman to go to court and file for an order of protec-
tion.  Failure to do so, they say, suggests that she is not serious about ending the abuse.
92 Wanless, supra note 50, at 566–67.
93 Id. at 567.  As noted previously, some jurisdictions have responded to the problem of
an unwilling victim by instituting policies that permit a prosecution to go forward irrespective
of the victim’s wishes. See Gruber, supra note 52, at 760; see also Mills, supra note 54, at
561; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Do-
mestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 327–28 (2005).  These poli-
cies have sparked considerable controversy among battered women’s advocates.  Some
advocates contend that the policies are themselves abusive of domestic violence victims. See,
e.g., id. at 555 (stating that the policies “do violence to battered women”).  Others believe that
notwithstanding the interference with autonomy, pursuit of such policies is necessary to pro-
tect the public good. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Partici-
pation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1870 (1996) (stating that
“[i]n the domestic violence context, the goal [of the criminal justice system] is to punish the
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to be misdemeanors that, upon conviction, result in little if any jail time94
may also play a part.  Ironically, this can pose somewhat of a Catch-22:
in many jurisdictions, felony charges and prison time might actually be
possible in these cases, but only after the offender has first been con-
victed of prior misdemeanor violations of the protection order.95
Whatever the reasons for it, the failure to bring charges in these cases can
be quite glaring.  One study of the phenomenon began with a group of
663 restrained batterers and found that about one-third (34%) were ar-
rested for re-abuse and violation of the protection order against them
within the next two years.96  Although arrested re-abusers who have vio-
lated orders of protection might be viewed as good candidates for prose-
cution, the study found that almost one-third (33%) of the cases against
these men were dismissed outright and another 10% were diverted with-
out a finding of guilt.97
Police and prosecutors aside, the “real consequences for violations
of protective orders” assumption also rests on the notion that when a
court order is violated, if nothing else, the court that issued the order will
take action.  It is true, of course, that an order of protection is a court
order, a violation of which can constitute contempt of court.  In theory,
the violation may be addressed as either a criminal or a civil contempt.98
In reality, however, the criminal contempt route contains a number of
obstacles, while civil contempt is wholly unworkable.  With criminal
contempt, the difficulty lies in the fact that the proceedings generally call
for the involvement of a prosecutor and, being criminal in nature, are
batterer in order to protect potential victims,” reasoning that ignoring a particular victim’s
wishes may therefore be “necessary to protect women overall”).  However, the Supreme
Court’s new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as articulated in Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) has forced prosecutors to
modify, but not wholly abandon, these policies; so their use—and the resulting controversy—
will likely continue.
94 See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL SERIES BULLETIN
NO. 4: ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS 2 (2002), available at  http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin4/ncj189190.pdf (“[T]he
[protective order] violator may be charged with a felony, a misdemeanor, or contempt of court;
however, in most states, felony treatment is reserved for repeat violations or aggravated of-
fenses.” (citations omitted)).
95 See id.
96 Andrew R. Klein, Re-abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers: Why
Restraining Orders Don’t Work, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 192 (Eve
S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
97 Id.
98 Although both involve disobeying or disrespecting a court, civil and criminal con-
tempt are quite different.  The basic difference lies in the purpose of the sanction once the
contempt is found.  In the words of the Supreme Court, “a contempt sanction is considered
civil if it ‘is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant.’”  Int’l Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827–28 (1994) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441(1911)).  By contrast, “‘it is criminal . . . [if it] is punitive, to vindicate
the authority of the court.’” Id. at 828.
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subject to due process requirements that tend to make them both more
complicated and more time-consuming than other order of protection-
related proceedings.99  With civil contempt, the nature of the proceedings
themselves is the problem.  Unlike its criminal counterpart, civil con-
tempt is designed, not to punish, but to create incentives on the part of
the offender to comply with the order; as they say, he “‘carries the keys
of his prison in his own pocket.’”100  As such, civil contempt can be
useful as a means of coercing “affirmative act[s].”101  Putting a batterer
in jail until he pays the child support included in a protective order, for
example, is a good candidate for the use of civil contempt.  However, the
coercive power of jail cannot be used to force someone not to do some-
thing, such as to force a batterer to stop battering.  Civil contempt is thus
ineffective as an enforcement mechanism against the violence.
Judges have also sometimes been reluctant to do their part in the
enforcement scheme where violations of orders of protection are con-
cerned.  Although resistance has not been as widespread as with police
and prosecutors, there remain some significant issues.  For example,
under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), it is a federal crime
for a person who is subject to a protective order obtained by an intimate
partner, and who meets certain other criteria, to possess a firearm.102
Yet, judges do not routinely inquire about firearms possession when issu-
ing such orders.103  In part, the failure to routinely inquire may be attrib-
99 The need for a prosecutor would arise because the contempt would be “indirect” in the
sense that the violation would have occurred outside the presence of the court and hence,
unlike with direct contempt, could not be punished summarily. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827
n.2 (describing “indirect contempts” as “those occurring out of court,” and noting that only
“[d]irect contempts,” or those “that occur in the court’s presence[,] may be immediately ad-
judged and sanctioned summarily”).  Various due process requirements such as the right to
counsel, right to a jury trial, and requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
would apply because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[c]riminal contempt is a crime
in the ordinary sense,” id. at 826 (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)), and
“criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections
that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings,” id. at 826 (quoting Hicks v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988)).
100 Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1902)).
101 Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828 (“[With civil contempt,] the contemnor is able to purge the
contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act . . . .”).
102 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000).  Under the legislation, conviction “in any court of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” has the same effect.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
103 See Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domestic Violence Cases,
6 J. CTR. FOR FAM., CHILD. & CTS. 3, 22 (2005).  At least one jurisdiction has taken note of
this problem and is attempting to address it. See NEW HAMPSHIRE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, CRIMINAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN NEW HAMPSHIRE COURTS (2005) (not-
ing the VAWA prohibition, determining that New Hampshire District Courts had ordered just
39% of criminal domestic violence to refrain from possessing firearms during the three-year
study period, calling the figure “lower than expected,” and recommending for the future
“[i]ncreased adherence to federal firearms laws”).
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utable to shortcomings in the applicable federal and state legislation,104
but there also has been definite reluctance (or worse) on the part of some
judges.105
More commonly, judges appear to be trying to perform their as-
signed role with orders of protection, but even then, false assumptions
can get in the way.  This happens, for example, whenever a judge in-
cludes in an order of protection a requirement that the batterer participate
in a batterer’s intervention, anger management, or similar program.  The
underlying assumption, of course, is that such interventions work; how-
ever, that optimism is not well-founded.  Recent studies of batterer’s in-
tervention programs indicate that such programs do not reduce future
abuse or change batterers’ attitudes about violence against women.106
Even organizations that provide these programs acknowledge their short-
comings.107  One expert, testifying in Congress at a hearing on proposed
legislation calling for federal funding of these and similar programs, ex-
plained the underlying misconceptions about the potential value of such
programs this way:
104 See Jennifer L. Vainik, Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and
Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1128–31 (2007).
105 See Sack, supra note 103, at 8 (“Substantial anecdotal evidence suggests that some
judges are attempting to evade the federal law or are directly refusing to comply with it . . . .
Commentators have speculated that this . . . may sometimes be due to judges’ personal beliefs
in the right to own guns and their reluctance to limit such access to respondents.”).
106 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DO BATTERER INTERVENTION PRO-
GRAMS WORK? TWO STUDIES 4 (2003). See generally Carla Smith Stover, Domestic Violence
Research: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Go From Here?, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 448, 448–54 (2005) (reviewing results of various recent studies and concluding that
such programs do not lower recidivism rates or change batterers’ attitudes). But see STEPHEN
BOCKO ET AL., MASS. TRIAL COURT, RESTRAINING ORDER VIOLATORS, CORRECTIVE PROGRAM-
MING AND RECIDIVISM (2004) (finding some apparent benefit from anger management
programs).
107 See, for example, the following caution, found on the website for the New York
Model for Batterer Programs:
Top 10 Reasons (otherwise known as Underlying Principles) . . . why the NY Model
for Batterer Programs does not treat, fix, cure, rehabilitate or otherwise get individ-
ual men to stop abusing women.  [We believe we must share the underlying princi-
ples that the NY Model is based upon, otherwise the model itself may not make
sense.]
. . . .
2. Focusing on ‘fixing’ gives a false sense of security and creates a distraction.
Abused partners, family members, the courts and the community – literally everyone
involved has, at one time or another, wanted batterer programs to “work.” It is a
reasonable and predictable hope.
However, batterer programs don’t reliably work.  At best, results are inconclusive.
And those programs that purport to achieve some individual change indicate, by
their own admission that “successes” are few and far between. What batterer pro-
grams do give, unfortunately, is a false sense of security that a man will be fixed
simply because he is enrolled in a program.
Top Ten Reasons, NEW YORK MODEL FOR BATTERER PROGRAMS, http://www.nymbp.org/prin-
ciples.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
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[Programs that] promot[e] . . . anger management, com-
munication skills, conflict resolution, budget counseling,
etc. are not remedies for domestic violence.  . . .
Domestic violence is not about relationships . . . . It is
about abusers and their use of violence.  [It] is instru-
mental, not accidental violence; purposeful, not inciden-
tal violence; premeditated, not spontaneous violence.
Abusers do not strike their partners because they are out
of control.  They strike their partners to maintain control
over them, humiliate and debase them, isolate them, or
punish them for asserting their independence.
Bank robbers do not rob banks because they have rela-
tionship problems with the banks or an inability to con-
trol their anger over capitalism.  They rob banks
because, as Willie Sutton aptly explained, that is where
the money is.  The same applies to abusers and why they
abuse.108
With batterers seemingly having so little cause for concern about
the possible consequences of non-compliance with orders of protection,
the evidence on the actual deterrent effect of these orders should come as
no surprise.  One of the first studies, conducted shortly after the wide-
spread adoption of protective order legislation, found that orders were
generally ineffective in stopping physical violence.109  Other studies
since then have been similarly disheartening.110  This is not to suggest
that there is no evidence at all of a deterrent effect.  One widely-cited
study, for example, found that in some circumstances, receiving a perma-
nent order of protection may reduce the likelihood that a battered woman
will be assaulted again by the same abuser.111  However, studies have
also consistently shown that orders have less effect on men with prior
108 Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R.
240 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Andrew
Robert Klein, Ph.D., Advocates for Human Potential, Inc.).
109 Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Effi-
cacy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLITICS AND WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF A LEGALLY MAN-
DATED CHANGE 13, 22–24 (Claudine Weber & Clarice Feinman eds., 1985).
110 See, e.g., Harrell & Smith, supra note 83, at 223 (finding a 60% re-abuse rate in a one-
year period following the issuance of a restraining order); id. at 209 (finding a 48.8% rate of
re-abuse within two years after an order was issued).
111 Victoria L. Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Re-
ported Violence, 288 JAMA 589, 589–92 (2002) (pointing out that their study focused exclu-
sively on police-reported incidents of violence, which they noted is estimated to be about one-
half the actual number of incidents); id. at 594 (citing BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY
(1995)).
2010] THE PERILS OF EMPOWERMENT 159
criminal histories,112 men who are unemployed,113 and men who have
substance abuse problems.114  Among batterers who have been arrested,
although married and employed men tend to be deterred to some extent,
violence is actually exacerbated when the batterer is unemployed and
unmarried.115  The lesson, it seems, is that if all batterers were married,
employed full-time, and without criminal records or substance abuse
problems, orders of protection might provide significant deterrence.  In
the real world, however, with batterers unfortunately well-represented in
every segment of our society, widespread deterrent impact is nothing
more than a pipe dream.
Having focused thus far on false assumptions relating to the impact
of orders of protection on batterers, we now turn to a different and, we
believe, far more pernicious false assumption, this one having to do with
the impact of the remedy on the women it is supposed to help.  Simply
put, here we refer to the assumption that, for women who avail them-
selves of the remedy, it will, in fact, have the desired empowering effect.
This assumption stems from a complete misunderstanding of the reality
of domestic violence for women who experience it and, thus, about what
it would take to empower them to take control of their own lives.  The
misunderstanding is especially acute when it comes to poor women who,
studies show, are particularly vulnerable to domestic violence and its
pernicious effects.116
When people hear about a woman suffering abuse at the hands of
her intimate partner, the usual first question is, “Why doesn’t (or didn’t)
112 Klein, supra note 96, at 202.
113 Richard J. Gelles, Constraints Against Family Violence: How Well Do They Work?, in
DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 36 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1996).
114 Klein, supra note 96, at 202.
115 Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Arrests Deter Domestic Violence, in
DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 48 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds.,
1996). As one study pointed out, these findings are wholly consistent with what is known as
the “stake in conformity” thesis of social control.  Matthew J. Carlson et al., Protective Orders
and Violence: Risk Factors for Re-abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 205, 208 (1999).  Originated
by sociologist Jackson Toby and popularized among domestic violence researchers through an
article by Lawrence W. Sherman and others, this thesis essentially posits that the more a
batterer stands to lose by disobeying an order of protection, the greater the likelihood of com-
pliance.  Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and
Informal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 680, 681–83 (1992). One study has
suggested that in arrest cases, police adherence to a previously established set of “fair” proce-
dures and the man’s perceptions as to whether he is being treated fairly by the police may also
affect the recidivism rate.  Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect
of Procedural Justice to Spouse Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 175 (1997).
116 See, e.g., Meehan Richmond, The Interface of Poverty and Violence Against Women:
How Federal and State Welfare Reform Can Best Respond, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 570–73
(2001) (“[D]omestic ‘violence affects poor women in two critical ways: it makes them poor
and it keeps them poor.’” (quoting Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women’s
Welfare in the Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141, 1144 (1995))).
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she leave?”117  Although there are many answers to that question,118 the
creation of the order of protection remedy appeared to some to be one
solution to the problem of battered women not leaving their batterers.
“Why doesn’t she leave?” would no longer be a concern, it was thought,
if we simply empowered her to make him leave instead.  Imagining that
to be an answer to the problem, however, assumes that once he is gone,
she will be fine.  The assumption essentially is that the physical and/or
emotional abuse is the only problem.  In reality, however, nothing could
be further from the truth.  Many abusers so isolate and demoralize their
victims that the victims are left with few support systems, and hence
have great difficulty getting on their feet when an order of protection
finally frees them of their abuser’s presence.119  Often their jobs have
been jeopardized by, if not lost entirely because of, the ongoing abuse.120
When a batterer leaves the household, his income often leaves with him
despite orders that he pay child support and maintenance.  Some women
are reluctant to insist upon the payments because they believe that they
may be at greater risk of retaliation and violence if they make such
demands.121
Even if the woman is granted residence in the home, she may not be
able to make the payments necessary to remain there.  A woman may
also flee the home because she fears having her batterer know where she
is living.  If space in a domestic violence shelter is available at all,122
women who escape to these shelters are generally allowed to stay for
117 It is telling that this is the question that usually comes up when dealing with domestic
violence, not the question, “Why do men batter?” See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity
and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 558 (1992).
118 See Sarah M. Buel, Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, A.K.A. Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28
COLO. LAW. 19 (1999).
119 See NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION (2002),
available at http://ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/help_series/pdftxt/domesticvi-
olencevictimization.pdf (“The emotional effects of domestic violence can often be more devas-
tating than the physical assaults.  Victims may lose touch with friends and family due to
abusers’ attempts to isolate them.  As a victim’s support system breaks down, so does his or
her self-esteem.”).
120 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 11, at 100.
121 See Heather R. Parker, Access Denied: The Disconnect Between Statutory and Actual
Access to Child Support for Civil Protection Order Petitioners, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 271,
285–87 (2007).
122 According to a 2007 nationwide census of domestic violence shelters and services,
during the one-day period covered by the census, there were 1,740 unmet domestic violence-
related requests for emergency shelter. See NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNTS 2007: A 24-HOUR CENSUS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHELTER
AND SERVICES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007).  Extrapolated over a full year, and with-
out taking into account that only about two-thirds of identified domestic violence programs
participated in the one-day count, that would amount to over one million unmet requests
annually.
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only a limited time123—certainly, less than the 6–10 months it takes on
average for a homeless family to secure housing.124  For some of these
women, their spotty work record and poor credit, which frequently go
hand-in-hand with domestic abuse, may hinder their ability to obtain ade-
quate housing.125  The net effect is that many of these women and their
children become homeless.126  The strong link between domestic vio-
lence and homelessness means that some women are forced to choose
between safety for themselves and their children and shelter.127
The fallout from the constant exposure to threats, violence, intimi-
dation, and psychological abuse complicates the picture for the suppos-
edly now-freed battered woman even more.  Domestic violence victims
often suffer from depression and display typical symptoms of stress such
as anxiety, nightmares, hyper-vigilance, low self-esteem, and feelings of
hopelessness and helplessness.128  Nonetheless, women who have been
isolated, abused, and under the control of a batterer over time often fail
to seek out medical and mental health professionals to address these is-
sues.129  Some cope with their depression and social isolation by self-
medicating.130  When the batterer is finally taken out of the home and
123 See NAT’L TASK FORCE TO END SEXUAL & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 2005: TITLE VI –HOUSING, available at http://
www.ncdsv.org/images/TitleVIHousingVAWA2005.pdf (“Many domestic violence shelters
are unable to house families longer than 30 days . . . .”).
124 Homeless Families, UNITED WAY OF KING COUNTY, http://www.uwkc.org/kcca/im-
pact/Homelessness/family.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
125 For the results of a Massachusetts study that looked at these problems, see THE ECON.
STABILITY WORKING GROUP OF THE TRANSITION SUBCOMM., GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE, VOICES OF SURVIVAL: THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, A
BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION 3 (2002).  According to the report, “sixty percent of those testifying
[at hearings before the working group] cited job loss, including being suspended and fired, as a
direct or indirect result of domestic violence.” Id.  In the course of the hearings, the group
“heard [testimony] about how domestic violence impeded victims’ performance or job ad-
vancement . . . [and] caused them to miss work, be late, or leave work early”; and they heard
about how “abusers . . . stalk, harass and sabotage their partners at work . . . steal and forge
signatures on paychecks, and strip victims of their bank accounts, credit and sometimes their
identities.” Id.
126 See Ellen L. Bassuk et al., Responding to the Needs of Low Income and Homeless
Women Who Are Survivors of Family Violence, 53 J. AM. MED. WOMEN’S ASS’N 57, 57–64
(1998) (finding that 60% of all homeless women have been victims of intimate partner vio-
lence as adults); see also THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS
SURVEY: A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 11 (2008),
available at http://www.usmayors.org/hhsurvey2007/hhsurvey07.pdf (citing survey-based re-
port citing domestic violence as one of the top three causes of homelessness among households
with children).
127 See Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL’Y
237, 237 (1994); Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 420, 421 (1991).
128 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 11, at 101–02.
129 See, e.g., Michelle Fugate et al., Barriers to Domestic Violence Help Seeking: Implica-
tions for Intervention, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 290, 290 (2005).
130 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 11, at 101.
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restrained from contact, these substance abuse issues may hinder the wo-
man from being able to maintain full-time work, provide adequate care
for children, or seek appropriate services that will assist in her recovery
from the abuse.  In short, getting the batterer to leave the home may be a
good first step toward protection from domestic violence, but there are
many additional issues that must be addressed for that remedy to be
meaningful.
Offering victims of domestic violence the remedy of seeking an or-
der of protection further assumes that getting an order will make them
safe— or at least, safer.  In reality, however, women who leave their
batterers are often at a heightened risk of serious assault.131  As the au-
thors of one study put it, “In spite of the widespread misconception that
ending the relationship will end the violence, it is quite common for bat-
terers to continue or even escalate the violence after the relationship
ends.”132  Scholars have called this “separation assault”133 and it is well-
documented.134  Often when a victim leaves her batterer, instead of ac-
cepting that the relationship is over, the batterer continues his pattern of
trying to exert power and control over her.  As previously noted, batter-
ers violate orders of protection by harassing, stalking, threatening, and
assaulting their former partner.135  Thus, far from enhancing her safety,
obtaining an order of protection may actually put a battered woman in
increased danger.
The final assumption we discuss here focuses, not on either the bat-
terer or the abused woman, but on the steps our society has taken to
address domestic violence.  We call it the “pat-on-the-back” assumption:
131 See Walter S. DeKeseredy et al., Separation/Divorce Sexual Assault: The Current
State of Social Scientific Knowledge, 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 675, 675 (2004).
132 Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the Violence:
Women’s Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1363,
1364–65 (2000) (citations omitted).
133 Martha Mahoney coined the term “separation assault” and explored the phenomenon
extensively in her pioneering article.  Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
134 See id.; see also Charlene K. Baker et al., Domestic Violence and Housing Problems:
A Contextual Analysis of Women’s Help-seeking, Received Informal Support, and Formal Sys-
tem Response, 9 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 754, 754–83 (2003); Walter S. DeKeseredy &
Carolyn Joseph, Separation and/or Divorce Sexual Assault in Rural Ohio: Preliminary Results
of an Exploratory Study, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 301, 301–11 (2006); Marilyn Ford-
Gilboe et al., Strengthening Capacity to Limit Intrusion: Theorizing Family Health Promotion
in the Aftermath of Woman Abuse, 15 QUALITATIVE HEALTH RES. 477, 477–501 (2005); Ma-
rina Morrow et al., Women and Violence: The Effects of Dismantling the Welfare State, 24
CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 358, 358–84 (2004); Robert Walker et al., An Integrative Review of
Separation in the Context of Victimization: Consequences and Implications for Women, 5
TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 143, 143–93 (2004).  Anecdotally, the story of John Alexan-
der’s murders of his estranged wife Kelli and her friend April Wheeler, recounted in the epi-
graph to this Article, provides an example of this phenomenon.
135 See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
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the sense that, while we have by no means conquered the problem of
domestic violence, at least we are finally taking it seriously.  One need
not look far, however, to find examples of strategies used to attack other
serious social problems that, when compared with how we have thus far
dealt with domestic violence, leave plenty of room to question just how
serious we really are.
For example, look at our treatment of sex offenders.  To deal with
them, we have adopted all kinds of special provisions and rules not appli-
cable in other situations, including, although not limited to, special evi-
dence rules that allow otherwise inadmissible evidence of a defendant’s
prior similar offenses at trial,136 special trial procedures that allow at
least some alleged victims to testify outside the presence of the defen-
dant,137 special laws that authorize civil commitment once a sentence has
been served,138 and special provisions that require those who are con-
victed but not civilly committed to register for listing in a sex-offender
registry upon their release from custody and then again any time they
move, making their names and addresses readily available on the web as
a warning to those who live nearby.139
To those who might argue that sex offenders are nothing like batter-
ers, we would merely point out that one of the main rationales given for
all this special treatment of the former is that sex offenders ostensibly
pose an unusually high risk of recidivism, and so if not stopped, will
continue to commit their truly horrendous crimes over and over again.140
Clearly, batterers fit that profile.  In fact, the recidivism rate for batterers
is much higher than that of sex offenders.141  Two Massachusetts Proba-
136 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413–15 (singling out for special treatment evidence of a de-
fendant’s prior similar acts in criminal and civil cases involving claims of sexual assault or
child molestation).
137 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (upholding against constitutional
challenge the Maryland procedures for allowing a child witness to testify for the prosecution in
a child sexual abuse case outside the presence of the accused).
138 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding as constitutional the
procedures under the state’s Sexually Violent Predator Act for allowing the forcible civil com-
mitment of persons meeting the statutory definition after they have served their full sentence
for a criminal offense).
139 See, e.g., Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program (Megan’s Law), 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
140 See Michael Teter, Acts of Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the Fed-
eral Rules Of Evidence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 153, 184 (2008) (“[Among the rationales for
special evidence rules in sexual assault and child molestation cases offered by Congressional
sponsors of Federal Rules 413–15 were that]: (1) sexual crimes are committed by a ‘small
class of depraved criminals’; [and] (2) these ‘depraved criminals’ are more likely than their
criminal counterparts to repeat their acts . . . .” (citation omitted)).
141 Persons who commit sex offenses are not a homogeneous group but instead fall into
several different categories.  Looking at reconviction rates alone, one large-scale analysis re-
ported that child molesters had a 13% reconviction rate for sexual offenses and a 37% recon-
viction rate for new, non-sex offenses over a five-year period and rapists had a 19%
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tion Office studies make this point well.  One study looked at all persons
in the state who had a civil restraining order filed against them over a
six-year period, and found that nearly 25% were what the study called
“serial batterers,” that is, persons named in at least two orders involving
at least two unrelated victims.142  The second of the studies focused on
persons who had been arraigned for violating a civil restraining order
during a single year, and found that over 40% met the serial batterer
definition.143  The latter of the two summed up the findings of the two
studies together this way:
Forty-three percent (43%) of those charged with a viola-
tion of a restraining order had more than one victim;
16% had three or more victims, consistent with their por-
trait as high risk violent individuals.  The figures on
these defendants, who have multiple victims, are much
higher than the 23.3% previously reported in our earlier
study on civil stage serial batterers.  The earlier study
sampled only those who had a civil restraining order
filed against them; the current study focuses on those
who have been arraigned for a violation of a civil re-
straining order.  One would expect a larger proportion of
defendants with multiple victims among this group.
Figures show that abusive behavior can persist and be
acted out against a number of individuals. Many defend-
ants are going to abuse whoever enters into a relation-
ship with them.144
We want to emphasize, we do not advocate inflicting the treatment
that our society now visits on sexual predators on anyone.  Our point,
again, is that this is what “taking seriously” can look like.  Would anyone
ever consider, for even a minute, telling a sexual predator’s victim to go
to court and seek an order if they want the conduct to stop?
reconviction rate for sexual offenses and a 46% reconviction rate for new, non-sexual offenses
over a five-year period.  R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussie`re, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-
Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348
(1998).  Another study found reconviction rates for child molesters to be 20% and for rapists
to be approximately 23%.  Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidi-
vism, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 85 (1995).  On the other hand, a five-year study of
batterers in Duluth, Minnesota, looking just at men who had received some form of treatment
following the battering incident, found that 40% of these men were in the justice system for
battering the same partner, a different woman, or had a protective order taken out against them.
Melanie Shepard, Predicting Batterer Recidivism Five Years After Community Intervention, 7
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 167 (1992).
142 SANDRA ADAMS, MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT, SERIAL BATTERERS: PROBATION RE-
SEARCH BULLETIN (1999).
143 BOCKO ET AL., supra note 106.
144 Id. (citation omitted).
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Of course, responding to serious social problems takes time and
does not happen overnight.  On the other hand, one need only consider
the response to the events of September 11, 2001 to see just how much
can be done in a short time if the resolve is there.  The array of anti-
terrorism laws and programs that our government managed to put in
place in less than a year’s time following the events of that day is truly
mind-boggling.145  Every American’s life has changed in fundamental
145 On April 11, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security issued a press release that
detailed all that had been done to protect homeland security beginning in September 2011:
1. Deployed more than 4,000 FBI special agents and 3,000 support staff to the
international investigation of the September 11 terrorist attacks - the largest
criminal investigation in history.
2. Responded to more than 8,000 cases of anthrax attacks or hoaxes.
3. Implemented the USA PATRIOT Act which, among other things: 1. updated
Federal laws to reflect the rapid and dramatic changes that have taken place in
recent years in communications technology; 2. required the Department of the
Treasury to require financial institutions to verify the identities of persons
opening accounts, granted immunity to financial institutions that voluntarily
disclosed suspicious transactions, and increased the penalties for money-laun-
dering; 3. broadened the terrorism-related definitions in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, expanded the grounds of inadmissibility to include aliens who
publicly endorse terrorist activity, and required the Attorney General to detain
aliens whom he certifies as threats to national security; 4. authorized grants that
will enhance state and local governments’ ability to respond to and prevent
terrorism, and expanded information-sharing among law enforcement authori-
ties at different levels of government.
4. Established 56 Joint Terrorism Task Forces and nearly 100 Anti-Terrorism
Task Forces to coordinate the investigations and improve communications
among federal, state, and local law enforcement.
5. Launched Operation Green Quest to dry up sources of terrorist funding. To
date, the assets of 192 individuals and organizations connected with the al-
Taqua, al-Barakaat, and Hamas organizations have been frozen.
6. Established a web site and toll-free hotline for citizens to report suspected ter-
rorist activity.
7. Adopted new, stronger encryption standards to safeguard sensitive, non-classi-
fied electronic information such as financial transactions, and ensure the pri-
vacy of digital information ranging from medical records and tax information,
to PIN numbers for millions of Americans.
8. Border and Port Security - Proposed INS regulations to eliminate the current
minimum six months admission period for B-2 visitors for pleasure, replacing
it with “a period of time that is fair and reasonable for the completion of the
purpose of the visit.”
9. Immediately required individuals planning to attend school in the United States
to obtain the proper INS student visa prior to their admission to the country.
10. Proposed INS regulations to reduce the maximum visa extension from one year
to six months. Additionally, the visitor must prove there are adequate financial
resources to continue to stay in the United States and that he or she is maintain-
ing a residency abroad.
11. Placed the nation’s air, land, and seaports of entry on Alert Level 1 following
September 11, ensuring a more thorough examination of people and cargo.
12. Created the new Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (Customs-
TPAT) initiative to enhance security throughout the entire import-export
process.
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13. Launched the Container Security Initiative, which establishes a tough new in-
ternational security standard for cargo containers.
14. Deployed approximately 1,600 National Guardsmen to assist in securing the
nation’s borders.
15. Increased National Park Service personnel and upgraded security equipment
and the procedures at highly visible national monuments, such as the Statue of
Liberty in New York, the National Mall in Washington, the Liberty Bell and
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, the Gateway Arch in St. Louis, and other
sites in the 384-unit National Park System.
16. Transportation Security - Recruited thousands of federal security personnel to
perform screening duties and other functions at commercial airports.
17. Significantly expanded the Federal Air Marshal program.
18. Announced the first group of Federal Security Directors. These experienced
law enforcement officers will be directly responsible for security at airports
and provide a clear and direct line of authority.
19. Developed new passenger boarding procedures and trained pilots and flight
crews for hijacking scenarios.
20. Required all airport personnel to undergo background checks.
21. Limited airport access points and implemented secondary screening
procedures.
22. Deployed more than 9,000 National Guardsmen to help secure the nation’s
airports. 23. Health and Food Security - Aided thousands of rescue workers
involved in the September 11 recovery activities through Disaster Medical As-
sistance Teams (DMATs).
23. Identified more than 750 victims of the World Trade Center attacks through
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs).
24. Dispensed antibiotics to thousands of persons potentially exposed to anthrax
mail attacks.
25. Acquired more than a billion doses of antibiotics and signed agreements for the
procurement of the small pox vaccine.
26. Distributed $1.1 billion to help states prepare for bioterrorism attacks.
27. Strengthened systems to prevent, detect and eliminate threats to agriculture and
the food supply, including $328 million for pest and animal disease prevention,
food safety, research, laboratory upgrades and stepped up security at key
facilities.
28. Distributed $2 million in grants to 32 states to bolster emergency animal dis-
ease prevention, preparedness, response and recovery systems.
29. Improved inspection and testing of products destined for consumer markets in
the United States.
30. Provided millions of dollars through the Food Stamp and Women, Infants, and
Children (WIC) programs to families of victims and displaced workers of the
September 11 attacks.
31. Environmental and Energy Security - Provided security training to drinking
water and wastewater utility companies.
32. Provided security guidance and support to private sector chemical and pesti-
cide manufacturers.
33. Conducted vulnerability assessments of energy infrastructure throughout the
country.
34. Created a 24-hour network to ensure energy producers have up to date infor-
mation from law enforcement information.
35. Provided 24 hour-per-day, 7 day-a-week security at 348 dams and reservoirs
and 58 hydroelectric power plants, including Hoover, Grand Coulee, Glen Can-
yon, and Shasta Dams.
36. Constructed biological, radiological, and nuclear mobile detection capability to
conduct threat-based searches.
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ways due to the government’s decision to take terrorism seriously.
Again, we point this out, not as advocates of our government’s so-called
war on terror, but to suggest that the pat on the back we have given
ourselves for all we have done to deal with the problem of domestic
violence may not be justified.
A comparison between the responses to this country’s September
11th experience and responses to domestic violence is instructive in other
ways as well.  Ironically, as Catharine MacKinnon has noted, the approx-
imately 3,000 people who died on September 11th is almost the same
number of women who die at the hands of male intimates in the United
States every year.146  Nevertheless, MacKinnon points out:
Much of the international community has mobilized
forcefully against terrorism.  This same international
community that turned on a dime after September 11th
has, despite important initiatives, yet even to undertake a
comprehensive review of international laws and institu-
tions toward an effective strategic response to violence
against women with all levels of response on the table,
even as the “responsibility to protect” from gross and
systemic violence is increasingly emerging internation-
ally as an affirmative duty.147
37. Placed nuclear power plants across the nation on the highest level of security.
38. Developed pocket radiation detector for first responders.
39. Engaged in a top-to-bottom security review of nuclear facilities, including
plant vulnerability to aircraft.
40. Citizen Engagement - Established Citizen Corps to enable Americans to par-
ticipate directly in homeland security efforts in their own communities. These
components include:
41. Medical Reserve Corps: Enables retired healthcare professionals to effectively
augment local health officials’ capacity to respond to an emergency.
42. Operation TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention System): Allows mil-
lions of American transportation workers, postal workers, and public utility
employees to identify and report suspicious activities linked to terrorism and
crime.
43. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT): Enables individual Ameri-
cans to participate in emergency management planning in their communities
and prepare to respond to disasters and other emergencies.
44. Neighborhood Watch Programs: Enhances the program by incorporating ter-
rorism prevention into its mission.
45. Developed the “Patriot Readiness Center” to help federal retirees return to ac-
tive service - more than 15,000 people have responded.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Strengthening Homeland Security Since 9/11
(Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0042.shtm.
146 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law
of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2006).
147 Id. at 2.
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MacKinnon suggests that one of the most striking post-September
11th changes was a “paradigm shift” in our willingness to treat private
individuals who perpetrate violence against civilians in ways previously
reserved just for states.148  Regarding this shift, MacKinnon remarks,
“[I]t shows what they can do when they want to.”149  She continues:
Violence against women is imagined to be nonstate, cul-
turally specific, expressive acts of bad apple individuals
all over the world that is so hard to stop.  Terrorism,
which is all of these, is said to be so serious, there is no
choice but to stop it, while seriously addressing threats
to women’s security is apparently nothing but a choice,
since it has barely begun.150
Investing faith in victim empowerment as the solution to the prob-
lem of domestic violence has paved the way for the ultimate false as-
sumption—the idea that when the solution fails, it is because of some
failure on the victim’s part: she won’t leave her batterer (or left but re-
turned), she won’t get a restraining order (or got one but later dropped
it), she won’t call the police (or did call them but then declined to follow
through with the prosecution), or, recalling the epigraph to this Article,
although she left and got a restraining order against her batterer, she
failed to carry a loaded gun when transporting the couple’s children to a
court-ordered visitation with him.151  The state cannot be held accounta-
ble for that, nor can any of the rest of us.152  Battered women therefore
experience all the perils of so-called “empowerment.”
B. Ideology in Tension with Strategy
For battered women’s activists, as a matter of ideology, taking an
empowerment-based approach to domestic violence made perfect sense.
As a matter of strategy, however, legislatively empowering individual
battered women to deal one-by-one with the violence against them is ill-
conceived as a way of achieving the sort of social change that movement
148 Id. at 3.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 18, 19.
151 See Madden, supra note 5, at B6.
152 As Ann Jones puts it:
Think of the messages a battered woman receives: A good marriage is worth fighting
for.  You can’t just walk out at the first sign of trouble.  It’s up to you to make it
work.  He needs you.  Stand by your man.  For better or worse.  Til death do us part.
Love means never having to say you’re sorry.  A good man is hard to find.  Good
husbands are made by God, good marriages by women.  Children need their father.
You owe it to him to help him through this.  And so on, ad nauseum.  And don’t
forget, he loves you.
ANN JONES, NEXT TIME SHE’LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND HOW TO STOP IT 127 (2000).
2010] THE PERILS OF EMPOWERMENT 169
activists had in mind.  In fact, if anything, the decision to pursue an em-
powerment strategy actually worked to undermine the movement’s larger
objectives.153  A comparison between these activists’ social change
agenda and the legislative measures they advocated will help shed light
on the tension between the two.
Recall that movement activists were seeking, among other things:
(1) to obliterate the old public/private dichotomy; (2) to foster a new
view of domestic violence as a societal harm that touches everyone, in-
cluding people who were not, and never had been, involved in a battering
relationship; and (3) to persuade these previously-uninvolved third par-
ties that, because they are harmed by violence in other people’s intimate
relationships, it is appropriate for them to get actively involved in a
broad-based effort to combat the problem.154  Against that backdrop,
however, they opted to press for the creation of a new legal tool that, to
ensure autonomy, victims could use or not as they saw fit.  Other aspects
of the new regime they advocated, including improvements in the crimi-
nal justice process response to domestic violence, also put a premium on
greater victim control.  If one accepts, as we do, Cass Sunstein’s idea that
law has an “expressive function”155—in other words, that law can
“mak[e] statements”156—then consider the message conveyed by this
new, victim-initiated, private remedy: the onus is on each domestic vio-
lence victim to seek a solution to her problem; the violence and other
forms of abuse ostensibly being inflicted on her by her batterer are
strictly between the two of them; and if she is not concerned enough
about the abuse to take legal action, then neither are we.  No doubt, this
was not the message that advocates of the empowerment approach in-
tended to convey; after all, it smacks of the very view of domestic vio-
lence that they were fighting to overcome.  But they did not anticipate
what “autonomy” and “empowerment” would mean to those who did not
look at the problem of domestic violence through the same lens as the
movement did.
To begin with, the terminology itself left room for confusion.
Granting a battered woman the power to obtain a protective order against
her batterer suggests some notion of autonomy, but without also granting
her the necessary resources and support, it is a false notion of autonomy
given the reality of the impact of violence on women’s lives.  A woman
who is responsible for the care of her children, her home, and the other
153 To be fair, the movement’s larger objectives were also undermined by the increased
reliance on the state to address the problem of domestic violence. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN,
supra note 15, at 36.
154 See supra notes 21–26, 59–62 and accompanying text.
155 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996).
156 Id. at 2024.
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relationships in her life is by definition not autonomous.  Legislatively
granting to her something she cannot possibly have will not change that.
Movement advocates understood all of this.  But from the perspective of
those outside the movement, the emphasis on autonomy justified the
view that women are responsible for ending the abuse in their lives and
that failure to do so is their own fault.
Advocates of the empowerment approach also did not appreciate
that the focus on autonomy, even as it supported empowerment, nonethe-
less still supported the public/private distinction.157  Instead of making
domestic violence a public concern, it keeps it private, retaining all the
isolation and individualism that characterize the so-called private realm.
The personal is still personal.  Although having some remedy for domes-
tic violence is a major improvement over the era in which harm done in
the home was not actionable at all, the empowerment approach has left
the social and cultural backdrop relatively undisturbed.
All this having been said, we want to emphasize that, although we
think our current approach to domestic violence is problematic, we do
not advocate dismantling the law in this area.  For one thing, for women
who are in abusive relationships, any avenue that could potentially pro-
vide them with support in combating the violence against them is a plus.
The possible expressive effects of, or “statements” made by, such a move
would also concern us.  Depriving abused women of an existing remedy
that purports to empower them to take charge of their lives simply sends
a bad message.  More importantly, any such dismantling of—indeed,
even just minor tinkering with—empowerment-centered legislation
might well be understood to suggest that, to address the problem of do-
mestic violence, the law is where the spotlight ought to be.  As elabo-
rated below, however, we are convinced that to make real headway at
this point, what is needed most is a drastic shift in focus and emphasis
away from the applicable legal rules and remedies and more in the direc-
tion of the social and cultural norms that have enabled the problem to
persist so stubbornly.
III. CHANGING SOCIAL NORMS
“Social norms,” in the words of one observer, “[l]ike cows, . . . are
easier to recognize than to define.”158  For our purposes, it is enough to
think of them as the non-official but very real rules and expectations that
prescribe how people are supposed to behave in various contexts—the
governing “shoulds” and “shouldn’ts,” as it were.  Social norms are often
157 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
21 (2004).
158 Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 476 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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built around assumptions and beliefs about how people behave and re-
spond.  By contrast with legal rules, which purport to regulate behavior
via a system of specified official sanctions to be imposed when infrac-
tions occur, social norms perform their regulatory function largely by
virtue of the fact that people tend to care a great deal about what other
people think of them.  This in turn motivates us to behave in ways that
conform to what we think will gain the approval of others and, perhaps
even more importantly, avoid their disapproval.
As noted previously, battered women’s advocates well understood
the role of social norms in relation to the problem of domestic violence
and identified several such norms in particular as prime targets for
change.159  For our purposes, it is helpful to think of these norms as
falling into two categories, one focusing on the abuse itself, the other
focusing on how we as a society respond to it.  In the first of these cate-
gories is a set of norms that, taken together, condone male power over
and aggression against women.160  In the latter category are the various
norms that tell us that abuse within an intimate relationship is a private
matter, properly the business of no one except the two intimates them-
selves.161  This is not to suggest that the two categories are wholly sepa-
rate; to the contrary, notions about gender and power play such a
prominent role in both that they are of necessity intertwined.  Nonethe-
less, viewing the norms in this way will help to clarify what we think the
problem is with the empowerment approach: it simply does not take suf-
ficient account of the latter category of norms, that is, the norms that tell
us, in effect, that however we personally may feel about the problem of
domestic violence, if violence of this sort is being done by and to some-
one else, it is not our concern.  In fact, we are convinced that progress
toward changing these particular norms—in other words, toward per-
suading people to view and treat the problem of domestic violence as
everyone’s concern—has actually been thwarted because of our reliance
on this approach to the problem.  This, then, is the norms challenge to
which we now turn.
We begin with a brief look at a few examples of the all-too-familiar
thinking to which we refer.  How often are these kinds of statements
made in discussions of a seemingly abusive relationship:
159 See supra notes 21–26, 59–62, 155.
160 The lessons of traditional gender-role socialization are perhaps the most obvious man-
ifestation of these norms.  Although clearly less rigid than they once were, these norms still
teach, for example, that men are supposed to be physically strong, independent, unemotional,
and in charge; while women are supposed to be sexually attractive and otherwise pleasing to
men, submissive, and emotional.  Such familiar sayings as “a man’s home is his castle” and
“[a woman should] stand by [her] man” also express these norms.
161 See generally KELLY, supra note 23 (arguing that fully addressing the problem of
domestic violence requires confronting the idea that it is a private issue).
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“What goes on within a couple’s intimate relationship is
no one else’s business but theirs.  This is true even of
violence between them.  After all, who am I to say
what’s right for them?  Granted, presumably, no woman
whose male domestic partner beats and otherwise abuses
her wants the violence and abuse to continue.  But all
intimate relationships involve ‘trade-offs’; and I cer-
tainly am in no position to tell her that whatever trade-
offs she is making that seemingly have her tolerating his
abuse are not, or should not be, worth it to her.  Anyway,
she is an adult, and if she feels she has had enough, she
can always leave.”
“Even if I personally thought that getting involved was
the right thing to do, I know how much people look
down on other people who stick their noses into things
that are none of their business (names like ‘prying,’
‘meddlesome,’ ‘busybody,’ and worse come to mind),
and I just am not one to rock the boat.”
The challenge, as we see it, amounts to this: how, if at all, does one
go about persuading people that something they have previously re-
garded as none of their business is, instead, properly their concern?  Or,
placed in context, how does one go about changing the social norms that
have long told us that other people’s domestic violence is none of our
business (or worse, the fault of the victim), so that such violence is in-
stead widely regarded as everyone’s concern?
Experience with other social problems teaches that the problems
that arouse the greatest concern throughout the community are often
those that pose, or at least are perceived as posing, a genuine safety risk
to the public at large: the general fear of being on a train when suicide
bombers choose to detonate their bombs, of being grabbed off the street
by sexual predators seeking to feed their depraved drives or by addicts
seeking money for drugs, or of being attacked by undeterred criminals
who, if not warehoused when caught, will commit the same crime again,
and again.  Clearly when something is viewed as affecting our own
safety and well-being, we have no reservations about getting involved.
Bearing that idea in mind, and recalling the question about changing do-
mestic violence-related norms posed above—“how does one go about
changing the social norms that have long told us that other people’s do-
mestic violence is none of our business (or worse, the fault of the vic-
tim)?”  One answer, it seems to us, may be to educate the general public
about the harmful effects of domestic violence on society as a whole.
Public health campaigns may serve as useful models for this endeavor,
both because of their extensive use of an array of sophisticated public
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education and marketing strategies and because the public health com-
munity consciously avoids engaging in blame-the-victim approaches to
solving health problems.
Perhaps the most successful public health campaign in recent his-
tory has been the campaign to curb smoking.  Although the analogy is
not perfect, the anti-smoking campaign provides a powerful example of
how such a campaign can change perceptions of harm and, in so doing,
shift the social norms about getting involved.  A look at the anti-smoking
campaign and some of the strategies it employed is instructive.
The campaign against smoking began in earnest in 1964 with the
issuance of the Surgeon General’s first report on the effects of smok-
ing.162  Although anti-smoking activists had been at work before then,
the 1964 report brought the issue before the general public for the first
time.  At the outset, the campaign focused almost exclusively on concern
for the smoker.  Strategies included extensive warnings about the health
risks of smoking and a multitude of programs designed to help people
quit.  At the same time, however, smoking was regarded as a matter of
personal preference, just one of the many autonomous choices that, in a
free society, people are entitled to make for themselves.  If someone
chose to take the risk and suffered harm as a result they would have no
one to blame but themselves; but it was a personal decision that was
theirs, and theirs alone, to make.163
About a decade later, a whole new anti-smoking campaign began to
take root.  Instead of focusing on smokers, the focus was on the health
risks of passive smoking to non-smokers.  The impetus was the 1971
Surgeon General’s report, which was the first to identify second-hand
smoke as a health concern.164  But it was a 1986 Surgeon General’s re-
port, The Health Consequences of Involuntary Smoking,165 that gave this
new campaign its most important boost.  Using the term “involuntary
smoking” to emphasize the lack of choice involved for the people who
were being put at risk,166 the report was unequivocal in concluding that
162 See ROBERT C. MCMILLEN ET AL., MISS. STATE UNIV., SMOKING IN AMERICA: 35
YEARS AFTER THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT 5 (2000), available at http://reposito-
ries.cdlib.org/context/tc/article/1040/type/pdf/viewcontent/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
163 See NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED, SECONDARY SMOKING, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC
SPACE, available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/Views/Exhibit/narrative/secndary.html (last
visited Aug. 23, 2010) [hereinafter SECONDARY SMOKING] (“[For years after the first Surgeon
General’s report], smoking was still regarded as a matter of personal choice and private risk,
not of communal good or public policy.  In a society that has held individuals responsible for
the risks they take—including including health risks—the right to smoke was championed as
part of the prerogative of all Americans to lead their own lives.”).
164 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOK-
ING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 10, 12, 281 (1971).
165 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUN-
TARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986).
166 Id. at ix–x.
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such non-consensual smoking was harmful to the health of non-
smokers.167
The mounting evidence of the dangers of exposure to secondhand
smoke began to change the attitudes of nonsmokers.  No longer was
smoking viewed as a matter of personal choice once people realized that
smokers were placing non-smokers at risk.  Moreover, as non-smokers
became better informed about the dangers to them, they also became
more willing to join, or even lead, campaigns to institute new tobacco-
free rules and policies.  In other words, once they perceived a genuine
safety risk to themselves and their loved ones, a matter they once viewed
as none of their business became very much their concern.  Noting this
response, one observer remarked, “[w]hile Americans consider it an as-
pect of their individual freedom to assume personal risks, they have little
tolerance for risks that others impose upon them.”168
An entire campaign was formulated to change smoking norms by
capitalizing on the observed link between concern about the dangers of
passive smoking and the willingness to get involved in smoke-free envi-
ronment efforts.  One book explains the approach this way:
The theory of change associated with eliminating non-
smokers’ exposure to secondhand smoke starts with in-
creasing people’s knowledge of the dangers of exposure
to secondhand smoke, changing their attitudes toward
the acceptability of exposing nonsmokers to secondhand
smoke, and increasing their support for passing and en-
forcing tobacco-free policies.169
Although the main emphasis of the anti-smoking campaign was on
health risks, other concerns about passive smoking were highlighted as
well.  One such concern had to do with the enormous economic costs of
167 Id. at ix (“[D]isease risk due to the inhalation of tobacco smoke is not limited to the
individual who is smoking, but can extend to those who inhale tobacco smoke emitted into the
air.”).
168 See SECONDARY SMOKING, supra note 163.
169 G. STARR ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, KEY OUTCOME IN-
DICATORS FOR EVALUATING COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS 127 (2005),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/tobacco_control_programs/surveillance_evaluation/
key_outcome/pdfs/key_Indicators.pdf.  Polling data gives a picture of just how much public
attitudes about second-hand smoke changed over time. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, More Smokers
Feeling Harassed by Smoking Bans, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, July 25, 2007, available at http://
www.gallup.com/poll/28216/More-Smokers-Feeling-Harassed-Smoking-Bans.aspx (reporting
an increase between 1987 and 2007 in public support for smoking bans applicable to hotels
and motels (from 10% in 1987 to 34% in 2007), the workplace (from 17% to 44%) and restau-
rants (from 17% to 54%)).
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passive smoking.170  Anti-smoking activists found that providing infor-
mation about these costs together with information about health risks
made for an especially powerful one-two punch.  According to one ac-
count, the net effect was to “highlight[ ] the social costs of smoking to
suggest that smoking was a burden that all members of society had to
bear.”171
As a result of the second hand smoke campaign, government build-
ings, workplaces, restaurants, and even bars have banned smoking on the
premises.172  Smoke-free areas cause considerable inconvenience to
those people who wish to engage in a still lawful activity.  Twenty-five
years ago, no one could have imagined that this campaign would be so
successful, particularly in light of the power of the tobacco lobby.173  Of
course, twenty-five years ago, anti-smoking campaigns were focused pri-
marily on the Surgeon General’s first report on smoking and concern for
the smoker.174  Seemingly, significant change in the societal norm that
tolerated smoking did not occur until the public was educated that smok-
ing harmed not only smokers, but non-smokers too.175
Of course, domestic violence is not smoking, and mounting a norm-
changing campaign against it clearly poses a number of challenges that
the anti-smoking campaign did not have to address.  Chief among these
challenges—indeed, it dwarfs all the others— is the fact that unlike the
norms associated with smoking, the norms associated with domestic vio-
lence are gender norms which, as far as norms go, are among the most
170 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SAVE LIVES, SAVE MONEY:
MAKE YOUR BUSINESS SMOKE-FREE (2005), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/ba-
sic_information/secondhand_smoke/guides/business/pdfs/save_lives_save_money.pdf.
171 Christopher J. Bailey, From “Informed Choice” to “Social Hygiene”: Government
Control of Cigarette Smoking in the US, 38 J. AM. STUD. 41, 54 (2004).
172 According to a national database maintained by the American Nonsmokers’ Rights
Foundation, as of April 1, 2010, “[a]cross the United States, 17,628 municipalities [we]re
covered by a 100% smokefree provision in workplaces, and/or restaurants, and/or bars, by
either a state, commonwealth, or local law, representing 74.2% of the US population.” AM.
NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., OVERVIEW LIST – HOW MANY SMOKEFREE LAWS? (1998),
available at http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/mediaordlist.pdf.
173 Elsa K. Ong & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Efforts Subverting International
Agency for Research on Cancer’s Second-Hand Smoke Study, 355 THE LANCET 1253,
1253–59 (2000) (describing the tobacco industry’s multi-million-dollar campaign to discredit
the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) study on secondhand smoke).
174 Kenneth E. Warner, The Effects of the Anti-Smoking Campaign On Cigarette Con-
sumption, 67 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 645 (1977).
175 Stanton A. Glantz & Patrick Jamieson, Attitudes Toward Secondhand Smoke, Smok-
ing, and Quitting Among Young People, 106 PEDIATRICS e82 (2000), available at http://pediat-
rics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/abstract/106/6/e82; Lisa K. Goldman & Stanton A. Glantz,
Abstract, Evaluation of Antismoking Advertising Campaigns, 279 JAMA 772 (1998), available
at http://jama.ama-assn.org/ (enter “Evaluation of Antismoking Advertising Campaigns” into
“search” and select  “Evaluation of Antismoking Advertising Campaigns”) (noting that focus
group participants indicated that industry manipulation and secondhand smoke are the most
effective strategies for denormalizing smoking and reducing cigarette consumption).
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resistant to change.176  Still, enough parallels can be drawn to the anti-
smoking campaign to make the exercise worthwhile.
At present, as was once the case with smoking, insofar as the gen-
eral public is concerned about domestic violence, it tends to be what
might be called “detached third-party concern”: we may have an abstract
concern about battered women (just as we once did and may still have
about smokers), but as long as neither we nor someone close to us is
being abused, it seems that we feel we lack enough of an investment to
get involved.  Of course, currently (and again, as was once true of smok-
ing), domestic violence is not seen as causing harm to the general public.
The actual evidence, however, suggests otherwise.  Study after study
makes clear that the effects of domestic violence are felt, not just within
the relationships in which it occurs, but by everyone.  Thus, and by way
of example only, all of us are put at risk in various ways because of the
enormous impact that domestic violence can have on children who are
exposed to it in their homes, both while these children are still children
and later, when they grow up.177  All of us can likewise become victims
176 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000).
177 According to a 1998 study, over half of the women who were abused in their homes
live in households with children under the age of twelve. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD ET AL.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES: ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT
OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS OR GIRLFRIENDS (1998).  Studies indicate that children who
are in such homes are at serious risk of being abused themselves.  One study found that 50% of
the men who frequently assaulted their partners also abused their children. FAMILY VIOLENCE
PREVENTION FUND, THE FACTS ON CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1, http://ucsfcge.org/
programs/srvr/pdf/Children.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).  The U.S. Advisory Board on
Child Abuse and Neglect cited domestic violence in the home as the single major precursor to
child abuse and neglect fatalities in the U.S. U.S. ADVISORY BD. ON CHILD ABUSE & NEG-
LECT, A NATION’S SHAME: FATAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN THE UNITED STATES 124
(1995); see also Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman
Abuse, NAT’L ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1999), http://
new.vawnet.org/category/Main_Doc.php?docid=389 (finding from a review and analysis of
records prepared for other purposes, “a large overlap between child maltreatment and woman
battering”).
Even when they are not the ones being abused, children who regularly witness domestic
violence in their homes can be deeply affected by what they see.  The negative consequences
for their physical health have been well-documented. See, e.g., Sandra A. Graham-Berman &
Julia Seng, Violence Exposure and Traumatic Stress Symptoms as Additional Predictors of
Health Problems in High-Risk Children, 146 J. PEDIATRICS 349 (2005).  Studies also indicate
that these children are more likely than other children to be violent and aggressive and to
suffer from a range of other problems, including depression, anxiety, and poor academic per-
formance at school. See, e.g., Ernest N. Jouriles et al., Physical Violence and Other Forms of
Marital Aggression: Links with Children’s Behavior Problems, 10 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 223
(1996); Gayla Margolin, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, in VIOLENCE AGAINST
CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 57 (Penelope K. Trickett & Cynthia J. Schel-
lenbach eds., 1998).  Not surprisingly, this has a ripple effect in classrooms across the country,
extending beyond the children who witness the violence to their classmates.  One recent study
examined the extent of this impact and the results were striking: having even one child ex-
posed to domestic violence in a classroom “significantly decrease[s] their peers’ reading and
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ourselves when a random batterer’s rage and need to control causes him
to pursue his victim out in public, into her workplace, or someplace else
where we just happen to be.  Granted, information as to the precise scope
of each such risk is probably more difficult to come by than is the case
with passive smoking, but both studies of and actual experience with risk
perception indicate that awareness of a particular risk is enough to
change attitudes even if its exact dimensions are not known.178  In the
words of one scholar, “The concept of risk is a psychological one.  Risk,
as opposed to danger, is a socially constructed phenomenon.”179
The physical risk to third parties is not the only parallel between
domestic violence and smoking; there is an economic costs parallel as
well.  A 2003 study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control esti-
mated the costs of domestic violence to be in excess of $5.8 billion annu-
ally.180  Obviously, these costs are not borne entirely by batterers and
victims; rather, all of us pay.  As with the physical risks—and once
again, as used to be the case with passive smoking—people simply do
not have the information they need to understand the extent to which it is
in their self-interest to get involved.  Our point here is simply that just as
information about the harmful effects of passive smoking motivated non-
smokers to advocate for new laws and policies, if domestic violence by-
standers understood what is at stake for them, they might be motivated to
actively support new initiatives that would provide enough resources and
other support to battered women.
Another possible answer to the challenge of changing our “other
people’s domestic violence is not my problem” norms comes from what
is known as social norms theory.  Social norms theory posits “that much
of people’s behavior is influenced by their perception of how other mem-
math test scores and significantly increase[s] misbehavior of others in the classroom.”  Scott E.
Carrell & Mark L. Hoekstra, Externalities in the Classroom: How Children Exposed to Do-
mestic Violence Affect Everyone’s Kids, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 14246,
at 1 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1231694.  Growing up around domestic vio-
lence can have serious longer-term effects as well.  In one study, 70% of teens who grew up in
homes with adult domestic violence self-reported violent conduct of their own as compared
with 49% of those who grew up in families without such violence. See BARBARA E. SMITH ET
AL., A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW, HELPING CHILDREN EXPOSED TO DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE: LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS 6–7 (2001), available at http://
www.abanet.org/child/dvchild.pdf.  Another group of researchers found that “boys exposed to
violence committed by their father are ten times more likely than boys from nonviolent homes
to use violence against an intimate partner in the future.” Id. at 7.
178 See Clinton M. Jenkin, Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric
Paradigm, 2 HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 1 (2006), available at http://www.hsaj.org/?arti-
cle=2.2.6 (“Riskiness is based on perception rather than fact, and this perception is based on
qualitative, not quantitative characteristics of the hazard being considered.”).
179 Id.
180 COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 13, at 2.  According to the CDC,
the bulk of the $5.8 billion was for health care costs, but they also attempted to estimate the
costs of lost productivity. Id.
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bers of their social group behave.”181  As applied to the kinds of “de-
tached third-party” noninvolvement norms that are of particular interest
to us, social norms theory would posit that “whether someone intervenes
is . . . influenced by the extent to which they feel that others in their
immediate environment share their concerns and will support their ef-
forts.”182  First used in campaigns to reduce drinking on college cam-
puses, this approach has since been used to address a variety of other
campus issues, ranging from sexual assault prevention to academic per-
formance.183  More importantly, for our purposes, as discussed below, it
has also been used in campaigns aimed at changing norms associated
with domestic violence.
One such effort was a joint project by the National Network on Vio-
lence Against Women and a South African multi-media health promotion
and social change agency known as the Soul City Institute.184  Con-
ducted over a six-month period, the campaign used social norms market-
ing strategies to address South Africa’s domestic violence problem.185
Another example is an ongoing project funded by the Family Violence
Prevention Fund that attempts to change the attitudes of men about vio-
lence in relationships.186  Recognizing that varying levels of intimate
partner violence may be a norm in their lives, the program, called
“Coaching Boys into Men,” is directed toward young boys.187  It is
founded on the belief that “[t]rue progress toward ending violence
against women and children will only be achieved when a critical mass
of men are actively involved in the solution by talking to the boys in their
lives.”188  The Fund reports that since 2000, when only 29% of men sur-
veyed said that they had spoken to their sons about not using violence in
their relationships, currently over 55% report such conversations.189  Yet
181 NAT’L SOC. NORMS INST., THE MAIN FRAME: STRATEGIES FOR GENERATING SOCIAL
NORMS NEWS 5 (2002), available at http://www.socialnorms.org/pdf/themainframe.pdf.
182 Alan D. Berkowitz, Fostering Healthy Norms to Prevent Violence and Abuse: The
Social Norms Approach, in PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND EXPLOITATION: A PRACTI-
TIONER’S SOURCEBOOK (Keith L. Kaufman ed., 2010) (manuscript at 3), available at http://
www.alanberkowitz.com/papers.php#2 (select “Fostering Healthy Norms to Prevent Violence
and Abuse: The Social Norms Approach”).
183 For information about the origins and some of the current uses of the social norms
approach, see Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L SOC. NORMS INST., http://
www.socialnorms.org/FAQ/FAQ.php (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
184 The project and results are described in detail in S. Usdin et al., Achieving Social
Change on Gender-Based Violence: A Report on the Impact Evaluation of Soul City’s Fourth
Series, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2434 (2005).
185 Id. at 2435.
186 See Coaching Boys to Men Media Campaign, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND,
http://www.endabuse.org/section/programs/public_communications/_coaching_boys (last vis-
ited Aug. 23, 2010).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
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another ongoing effort is the University of New Hampshire’s “Know
Your Power Media Campaign” which encourages community and third-
party involvement in preventing violence against women.190  Although
these programs and projects obviously vary in their particulars, the com-
mon thread running through all of them is that they direct their efforts at
previously uninvolved community members and try to involve them in
domestic violence work.  In the words of social norms theory pioneer
Alan D. Berkowitz, who has frequently voiced concerns akin to our own
concern about over-reliance on the empowerment approach to domestic
violence,—“Ending violence against women has always been seen as the
province of women . . . . But seeing violence prevention as only the
responsibility of women is an example of thinking that perpetuates the
problem.”191
The Federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
takes a similar approach to domestic violence.  It characterizes intimate
partner violence as a community problem and has developed and funded
programs designed to be a more comprehensive approach to dealing with
domestic violence.  The Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement
and Leadership Through Advancement (DELTA) program is an example
of a CDC-funded effort to address the need for community and societal
level change.  The CDC identifies social norms marketing campaigns as
a critical part of the strategy to “promote social norms, policies, and laws
that support gender and economic equality and foster intimate partner-
ships based on mutual respect, equality, and trust.”
Researchers who have studied these programs have even reported
some successes.  One result from the Soul City campaign is especially
notable given the social norms challenges that lie ahead here: a reported
18% increase in the number of people who rejected the view that domes-
tic violence is “a private affair.”192  Scholars who study the efficacy of
violence against women prevention programs have also written about the
promise that these kinds of programs seem to hold.193  We want to em-
phasize, however, that even if there were no evidence of short-term posi-
tive effects, we would nonetheless advocate the use of strategies aimed at
getting the entire community to view the battle against domestic violence
190 See generally KNOW YOUR POWER, http://www.know-your-power.org/ (last visited
Aug. 23, 2010).
191 Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Alliances
(DELTA), Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/DELTA/de-
fault.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).
192 Usdin et al., supra note 184, at 2440.
193 See, e.g., Victoria L. Banyard et al., Bystander Education: Bringing a Broader Com-
munity Perspective to Sexual Violence Prevention, 32 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 61 (2003);
Berkowitz, supra note 182; Patricia M. Fabiano et al., Engaging Men as Social Justice Allies
in Ending Violence Against Women: Evidence for a Social Norms Approach, 52 J. AM. C.
HEALTH 105 (2003).
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as their battle too.  There simply is no other way to bring about the social
and cultural changes that in our view are essential if we are going to turn
the page on domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
Our current approach to domestic violence places too much empha-
sis on victim-initiated remedies in the name of empowering victims.  Re-
cent efforts to address other public health and social problems have
gotten entire communities involved in matters that they previously
viewed as not their concern.  Whether through disseminating information
about previously little-known costs, correcting misperceptions about
what other people think, or some combination of these or similar strate-
gies, the campaigns have resulted in remarkable changes in the public
attitudes and conduct.  Domestic violence not only deeply harms the im-
mediate victim, it exacts a toll on all of us by imposing enormous eco-
nomic costs while incubating troubled and sometimes vicious people as
children witness and suffer from the violence at home.  These are costs
that could form the basis of a campaign that engages everyone in an
effort to reduce tolerance for domestic violence.  Spreading the word that
many people actually disapprove of such violence and abuse could also
be part of these campaigns to encourage people who now remain silent
about their disapproval to speak out.  As social norms change, so, too,
will the law and the law’s efficacy in reducing the amount of violence
against women.  The answer to the problem of domestic violence is not
to empower a victim to procure a protection order and carry a concealed
weapon to ensure enforcement.  It is to recognize that the perils she faces
are of concern to us all.
